Towards Trustworthy e-Voting: An Open Source Approach?
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| == Detailed Description == | == Detailed Description == | ||
| - | There is a growing belief â for example, articulated in several writings by David Pogue of the NY Times â that to restore trust in elections requires a combination three efforts: [a] properly engineering the required assurance, reliability, security, and trust into voting machinery without regard to "returns on investment" or "shareholder instrument;" [b] using open source methods to ensure transparency, self-sustaining audit loops, and public examination; and [c] placing the results in the public trust, making them freely available for any government or vendor to adopt and use to produce production equipment. | + | There is a growing belief that to restore trust in elections requires a combination three efforts: [a] properly engineering the required assurance, reliability, security, and trust into voting machinery without regard to "returns on investment" or "shareholder instrument;" [b] using open source methods to ensure transparency, self-sustaining audit loops, and public examination; and [c] placing the results in the public trust, making them freely available for any government or vendor to adopt and use to produce production equipment. |
| There are questions about [a] the viability of this approach, [b] whether and to what extent open source can properly address all of the issues of assurance, trust, and security; and [c] the likelihood of wide spread adoption of the results. Therefore, we believe the concept of open source voting technology should be publicly discussed, explored, and vetted. | There are questions about [a] the viability of this approach, [b] whether and to what extent open source can properly address all of the issues of assurance, trust, and security; and [c] the likelihood of wide spread adoption of the results. Therefore, we believe the concept of open source voting technology should be publicly discussed, explored, and vetted. | ||
Revision as of 14:47, 3 May 2008
Panel Summary
The troubles with voting machines produced by the private sector are well documented. One significant cause is that today's systems amount to "black box" voting compelled by necessary private sector business interests. In an increasingly digital democracy the use of computers seems unavoidable. Can open source methods to develop trustworthy hardware and software help us move toward "glass box" voting? This Panel examines the viability of this approach and what would be required for adoption.
Detailed Description
There is a growing belief that to restore trust in elections requires a combination three efforts: [a] properly engineering the required assurance, reliability, security, and trust into voting machinery without regard to "returns on investment" or "shareholder instrument;" [b] using open source methods to ensure transparency, self-sustaining audit loops, and public examination; and [c] placing the results in the public trust, making them freely available for any government or vendor to adopt and use to produce production equipment.
There are questions about [a] the viability of this approach, [b] whether and to what extent open source can properly address all of the issues of assurance, trust, and security; and [c] the likelihood of wide spread adoption of the results. Therefore, we believe the concept of open source voting technology should be publicly discussed, explored, and vetted.
